Prof. Dominika Wojtowicz, Associate Professor at the Department of Economics argues that the leadership of the mayors proved decisive in how cities accepted refugees from Ukraine in 2022.
When Russia attacked Ukraine in February 2022, within a few weeks over 1.5 million people fleeing the war arrived in Poland. The state had no ready plan for this situation. Prior to 2022, Poland had neither a coherent migration policy nor a comprehensive refugee integration system. Thus, the burden of taking in the new arrivals largely fell on cities.
This is the beginning of a story worth telling: although all local governments operated within the same legal framework, with comparable budgets, and under the same time pressure, some fared better than others. This is why we studied twelve Polish metropolitan cities to find out what lies behind this difference. The findings may be valuable both for local government officials and for anyone wondering why some public institutions are able to respond quickly to unexpected challenges, while others get bogged down in regulations.
Different responses to the same crisis
Though acting within the same legal and logistical framework, Polish cities adopted very different strategies. Some limited themselves to fulfilling obligations imposed by the special act of March 2022: issuing PESEL-UKR (national id) numbers, referring people to social assistance centers, and arranging school placements. Let’s call this type of action “reactive”: it means conscientiously carrying out orders from headquarters, without going any further.
Other cities did more. They created specialized departments for integration of foreigners, appointed special representatives, and convened cross-sectoral teams with NGOs, employers, and universities. They launched bilingual information portals, designed intercultural competency training for officials, and organized public consultations on assistance principles. We called this approach “proactive”: cities did not wait for instructions from the capital, but devised solutions themselves based on their own local circumstances.
Interestingly, these different approaches to the same issues did not match instinctive assumptions. It was not solely a matter of budget size or the number of arriving refugees. Both major metropolises such as Warsaw, Wrocław, and Poznań, as well as smaller centers—Katowice, Łódź, Kraków, and even Białystok, a city with relatively modest resources could be found among the proactive cities. The reactive cities included Gdańsk, Rzeszów, Lublin, Bydgoszcz, and Szczecin, also very different in terms of resources and the scale of arrivals of people from Ukraine.
How we sought answers
We used Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to understand what distinguishes these two groups of cities. We did not look for a single “one-variable-explains-it-all” factor; such thinking rarely works when dealing with complex collective decisions. Instead, we examined which combinations of conditions emerged in cities that acted proactively.
We considered six factors: the scale of the refugee influx (what percentage of the city’s population they constituted), their economic situation (primarily the level of unemployment among them), local socio-economic capabilities (the labor market, educational and medical infrastructure), residents’ attitudes (whether they believed the presence of refugees was beneficial for Poland), the administration’s effectiveness in crisis management, and the leadership of the mayor. Data was taken from the Central Statistical Office (GUS), studies conducted by the Union of Polish Metropolises, in addition to twelve in-depth interviews conducted with city officials, and responses to a specially-devised survey.
An unexpected hero: the mayor
The most striking finding in our analysis is that every single proactive city took action because of the strong, committed leadership of its mayor. This means that, despite all other varying factors, if the city hall was not led by a person personally committed to the cause, the city remained stuck in a bureaucratic routine.
But what exactly does “strong leadership” mean? In the study, we examined four issues: whether the mayors publicly voiced a vision for accepting refugees and shaped the local debate; whether they actively sought funding, partners, and political support outside usual channels; whether they personally promoted new instruments to do so; and whether they were able to negotiate with central administration to fight for greater flexibility for their city. In cases where these four elements were present, cities exceeded the statutory minimum. When they were absent, neither generous budgets nor residents’ goodwill helped.
This finding is particularly significant in the Polish context because, formally, cities lack authority over migration matters; the entire system is centralized. And yet, it turns out that a local leader can achieve a great deal within such a modest framework, provided they decide to make use of the margin of discretion which is always there.
Four different paths to the same goal
Although leadership was a common denominator, proactive cities came to their solutions using different routes. The analysis revealed four distinct patterns.
- The first route (Warsaw, Poznań): relatively few refugees compared to the number of residents, but in a difficult economic situation, and a strong labor market and infrastructure, even if residents’ attitudes were not particularly enthusiastic. These cities relied on a formal framework for cooperation, that is steering committees, city bills which defined the scope of assistance, and comprehensive adaptation programs. Professional coordination made up for the lack of public enthusiasm.
- The second route (Katowice, Wrocław): a large influx of refugees in a difficult situation, but favorable conditions in the cities with a strong labor market, infrastructure, and the residents’ welcoming attitude. Here, a participatory approach was adopted, including large-scale intercultural events, roundtables, collaboration with universities on policies, and public consultations. The supportive social climate allowed for more ambitious and open forms of residents’ engagement.
- The third route (Łódź): small-scale influx, and the city’s limited economic capacity, as well as initially weaker administrative efficiency, but a supportive community and a committed mayor. Łódź responded to this situation by building institutions. The city formed the Department for the Social Integration of Foreigners, created the position of representative for humanitarian affairs, next to interdisciplinary working groups, in addition to announcing competitions for integration projects. Organizational ingenuity offset the lack of resources.
- The fourth route (Białystok): conditions were similar to those in Łódź, but completely different solutions were reached. Białystok focused on practical informational support and grassroots cooperation: a bilingual online platform, coordination teams led by representatives, a broad network of over 50 NGOs grouped into thematic working groups, as well as securing funding from UNICEF. Instead of building a complex administrative structure, a flexible network of partnerships was formed.
The conclusion is that there is no single “recipe for success.” What works in Warsaw won’t necessarily work in Białystok, but each routes requires a person to take responsibility for it.
What does this mean in real life?
The findings of this study extend far beyond the context of refugees from Ukraine; they show how, in general, local governments in Poland operate in emergency situations, and what can be done to improve their performance.
- First, for city residents: the quality of local leadership has real-life, tangible consequences. With the same laws, similar budget constraints, the same crisis, daily experiences of refugees – and of residents interacting with local governments – can be very different. This means that local elections are not an abstract matter about “who will represent the district.” They are a choice how to act in situations we do not yet know.
- Second, for local officials: to start acting differently you don’t no need to wait for laws to change or for larger money transfers from the central budget to arrive. The margin of freedom in the Polish system is narrower than in many Western countries, but it nonetheless exists. You can appoint a representative, you can build a coalition with NGOs, you can negotiate the terms of cooperation with the voivode. Białystok, a city rarely referred to as a model of modern governance, has shown that this can be achieved even with limited resources.
- Third, for decision-makers at the national level: local government staff development programs, crisis management training, and networks for sharing experiences between cities are not a luxury, but an investment in the resilience of the state. Money and procedures alone will not ensure a proper crisis response. What is needed are people willing to take responsibility and the expertise to do so wisely.
- Fourth, for people managing NGOs and businesses: in the Polish model of crisis response, partnerships with local governments are not just a way to secure funding, but constitute genuine shared responsibility. In proactive cities, it was exactly this multi-stakeholder coalition – of NGOs, employers, universities, and volunteers – that shaped the solutions. Strengthening this cooperation during time of peace pays off when a crisis strikes.
The events of 2022 in cities in Poland discussed here exemplify the first such massive test of local administrative resilience in Europe’s post-World War II history. Not everyone passed this test with flying colors but those who did show tips on how to prepare for the next one. The next test one will come, and not necessarily in the form of a war next door; it could be a climate disaster, an energy crisis, or a pandemic. The question is not “if,” but “when” and “in what state we will be.” As our study shows, the answer starts with each city hall.
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The research article is available in Urban Affairs Review: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/10780874261439763. This study was carried out thanks to the National Science Centre grant no. 2022/45/B/HS5/00933.
The article was machine translated.
